



Ifiok: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies                                              Vol. 3, No.1. 2017 
ISSN 2408-6800  
http://ifiokjournal.com  
  
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM LOGICALLY  
 
Cyril Asuquo Etim  
Department of Philosophy, University of Uyo, Nigeria. 




We are concerned in this paper to establish the rationality of American legal 
realism by adopting a theory of reconstruction. American realism is plagued 
with dichotomies in relating theory and practice; and the need to broach these 
dichotomies involves transcendence of experience and transference of 
consciousness. In doing this, we have both to excavate and to justify its 
philosophy, logic and science. American legal realism has its root in the 
philosophy of pragmatism and a logic that sets out the essential elements 
associated with the making and determination of the law through 
instrumentality of the court. The validity of this category of legal theory tends to 
lie on the extent of immediate use to which law can be put or the benefits it can 
afford the American society. Believing in the possibility of a realistic theory of 
law that is purely American precludes belief in universal understanding of 
human legal experience distinct from the understanding gained through the 
cultural lenses of the American people. Although American realists differ 
remarkably even within a single paradigm, nevertheless three areas of logical 
unity among them are that: They bear a cross relevance, a complementing and 
interlocking of results, and a similar faith in attacking legal problems. A 
completely empirical understanding of American legal realism seems nebulous, 
because causality presupposes the interaction of American liberal and legalistic 
political attitudes. Legalism is the life wire of American culture and this makes 
distribution of rights and legal predictability possible: incidentally language is 
an important instrument for making this happens. Countries seeking to adopt 
the American model of legal order or something similar to it should be capable 
of an equivalent orientation in terms of formulating their philosophy, logic and 
science of adjudication. 
 
Keywords: American legal realism, legal realism, Pragmatism. 








In order to understand American legal realism, one has to study 
pragmatism and the rhetoric of American culture as a reflection of the moral, 
aesthetic, social and political life of the American world. A discourse on modern 
trends in American legal realism would not be complete without some reflection 
on the influence of colonialism on that theory together with the intellectual 
forces of that age such as historicism, romanticism and utilitarianism. Prior to 
1776, law in the territory now called United States of America (USA) was 
instituted by European powers who introduced British common law principles 
into the legal system of that society. The arrival of the declaration of 
independence signaled a new beginning in American law with a shift from 
parliamentary to presidential legal and political order to chart a peculiar course 
of life for the people. Although colonialism marked the genesis of American 
legal history, it nevertheless would seem a little more realistic to associate the 
way American courts decide cases today with her post independence 
developments in the judicial process.  
In all legal systems, realists try to show a sensible and practical idea of 
what can be done or achieved with law, thus they are prepared to deal with a 
situation as it is without pretending it is different. However, anti-realists deny 
the reality of independent existence of things, so that the operation of American 
legal realism generally engenders some conflicts as to dichotomies between 
experience and reason, thought and action, theory and practice, value and fact, 
interest and law. From all indications, American realists do not seem to 
constitute a particular school of law; rather they all tend to be seen as sceptics. 
They differ on seeing law in normative terms as an order regulating human 
conduct in a society and it follows by their approach that law is not a system of 
rules as conceived by American sociologists. The realists therefore indicate a 
problem with the normative approaches to analysis of law, because they do not 
clearly distinguish between the work of legislation and that of adjudication. We 
want to show in this paper that, as a rational activity, American legal realism is 
predicated upon a philosophy, logic and science that aim at uniting law and life 
in an efficiently and effectively organised socio-political system in which 
equality and justice prevail. Be this as it may, we will agree that some tenets of 
American legal realism belong to the teachings of realism generally while some 
of its tenets are peculiar to the American situation. We want to argue that here 
philosophy is a comprehensive way of life; and that for the Americans, this way 
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of life resides in pragmatism. We will also try to show that the logic of American 
law is a body of knowledge systematically distilled from the adjudicative 
process based on the culture of the American people. It is also necessary to show 
that the scientific study of American legal realism reflects the analytic process on 
the basis of which its reconstruction is posited.  It is on this edifice that legal 
knowledge is grounded in American law, and the thrust of this law is its 
dependence on practical functions in the society, one which is capable of 
explanation in terms of “judicial behaviourism” (the customary or patterned 
behaviour of judicial officers) that serves to make law predictable. However, 
since thinkers are critical about the justification of American legal realism for 
lack of homogeneity in all its camps and ideas, one may question the possibility 
of a valid logic for American legal realism. We therefore want to show that the 
attempt to reconstruct American legal realism lies in the desire to broach various 
dichotomies that argue against its justification as well as eclectify the essential 
tenets of the old and new systems of the theory. The overall intention is to 
provide a holistic understanding of how American law works in terms of 
meaning, nature, and knowledge culled from its effect on society. The outcome 
of this enterprise will serve as the science of American law. In what follows, we 
shall deal with the philosophy of American law.  
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 
The philosophy that shapes the logic and science of American legal 
realism is “pragmatism”, which incidentally happens to be regarded as 
American traditional philosophy. The traditional view of pragmatism is given 
by Simon Blackburn, who appears to have combined its theoretical and practical 
perspectives into a holistic approach to knowledge. Blackburn (297) describes 
pragmatism as philosophy of meaning and truth with the assumption that the 
practical value of a belief or theory lies in its meaning and truth. In popular 
parlance, “pragmatism” is associated with the practical; and this is seen as 
complementing the theoretical. This implies that pragmatism is the philosophy 
of unity of thought and action. The goal of philosophy, according to 
pragmatism, is that it ends in a conclusion which when they are referred back to 
ordinary life experiences and their predicament renders them more significant, 
luminous and make our dealings with them more fruitful. We can see that the 
doctrine proposed by Immanuel Kant on the primacy of practical over pure 
reason plays an important role in the theory of meaning and truth. Kant (17-21) 
sees pure reason as reason unmixed with anything empirical or practical, while 
practical reason is most generally any reasoning aiming at a conclusion 
concerning what to do. Accordingly, very little of what is due to pure reason is 





devoted to common sense and human action. To be pragmatic is to be practical 
or to be concerned with doing things. In another dimension, Udo Etuk refers to 
pragmatism as philosophy of action. The reason, according to Etuk (55), is that 
pragmatism is a method of logic for solving intellectual problems. In terms of 
methodology we will agree that while different schools have frequently claimed 
that there is only one correct approach to philosophical problems, the march of 
history has not seen any emerging consensus. V. C. Morris and Y. Pa are 
concerned with pragmatism in its growth and advancement through history. 
Morris and Pa (43) see pragmatism as a scientific philosophy of experimentalism 
and thereby link it with instrumentalism. It should be noted that 
experimentalism is concerned with controlled manipulation of events to 
produce observation that confirms or disconfirms a belief or claim, whereas 
instrumentalism is the view that a scientific theory is to be regarded as an 
instrument for prediction and new techniques for controlling events but not 
itself capable of literal truth or falsity. Interestingly, experimentalism and 
instrumentalism are alike in being doctrines of prediction, whereas the 
distinction between them is marked by their stages of development.  Of course, 
we may argue that instrumentalism is the developed form of experimentalism.  
William F. Lawhead and Robert Audi describe pragmatism in terms of 
the relation between experience and reason. While Lawhead (460) describes 
pragmatism as the principle of uniting thought and action, Audi (638) refers to it 
as a philosophy that stresses the relation of theory to praxis and takes the 
continuity of experience and nature as revealed through the outcome of directed 
action as the starting point for reflection. Audi argues that knowledge in this 
case is guided by interests or values. The assumption here is that since the 
reality of objects cannot be known prior to experience, truth claims can be 
justified only as the fulfillment of conditions that are experimentally 
determined.  
The founding fathers of pragmatism are Charles Sanders Peirce (1839 – 
1914), William James (1842 – 1910) and John Dewey (1895 – 1952) all these men 
being Americans. Together, these thinkers stress an emphasis on what works in 
experience rather than on empty theories. In order to ascertain this belief, Peirce 
sets forth the pragmatic maxim as follows: 
In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception we should 
consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by 
necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these 
consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception (481).  
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 What Peirce says here is captured by the view that the meaning of a 
proposition or intellectual conception is determined by practical consequences, 
which thus serves as the third criterion of the maxim. We are concerned with 
pragmatism in the attempt to solve intellectual problems. Thus we may say that 
what it takes for a proposition (or theory) to be regarded as working is not its 
correspondence with fact by way of reflecting experience, nor is it the coherence 
of propositions in terms of one proposition fitting into a set of other 
propositions, nor is it linguistic in the sense of what is the case. It must show “a 
practical way of thinking or dealing with problems that emphasises results and 
solutions” (Rundell 1162), which is why it is brought to bear on propositions as 
having practical rather than theoretical values. Explaining the pragmatic statues 
of such a proposition or theory, Godfrey Ozumba writes:  
The pragmatic theory of truth holds that it is what works in practice that 
is true. What does not work is not true. Truth is tested through 
consequences of ideas or statements whether they are beneficial or 
adverse to human well being. Pragmatism is a kind of humanism (77).  
We may deduce from this view that pragmatism is fact oriented and observation 
based; and the central themes that set the pace for justifying the workability of 
pragmatism are truth, cash value and instrumentalism.  To speak of truth is to 
speak of the workability of a belief or theory, which is why Ozumba (77) 
describes the pragmatic theory of truth as holding that it is what works in 
practice that is true. The ideal of cash value is located in the immediate use to 
which a belief or theory is put or the benefit it is supposed to yield. 
Instrumentalism thrives on the capacity of experience to make prediction. This 
is to say that instrumentalism is performed as action in the course of the 
interaction between a biological organism and its environment. 
The importance of pragmatism to American legal experience may be 
discerned historically. Michael David Alan Freeman gives a brief historical 
account of American legal realism and its connection with pragmatism. Freeman 
(799-800) links American legal realism with the creed of laissez faire, a practice 
believed to have defined the dominant creed in America of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. The creed was associated in the intellectual sphere with Romanticism, 
a feature marked by a reverence for the role of logic, mathematics, a priori 
reasoning as applied to philosophy, economics and jurisprudence. It showed 
little urge to link these disciplines empirically to the facts of life in spite of the 
increasing dominance of the American society by empirical science and 
technology. The consequence of that intellectual development was to treat 
philosophy, social science, and even logic as empirical studies not rooted in 
abstract “formalism” - “the view that mathematics concerns manipulations of 





symbols according to prescribed structural rules” (Audi 273). Freeman 
maintains that James and Dewey spearheaded the movement in the area of 
philosophy and logic; Thorstein and Veblen took the area of economics; Beard 
and Robinson took up historical studies, while Holmes faced the province of 
jurisprudence. While writing about the impact of the Romantic Movement on 
European and American cultures between 1775 and 1830, Blackburn (332) 
maintains that it was partly a reaction against the stiff rationality of the 
Enlightenment and its official, static, neo-classical art in favour of the 
spontaneous, the unfettered, the subjective, the imaginative and emotional, as 
well as the inspirational and heroic. The Romantic Movement seemed to have 
been essentially hostile to the so-called British empiricism derived from David 
Hume (1711-76) and to which great thinkers like Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), 
John Austin (1911-60) and John Stuart Mill (1806-73) showed adherence. Though 
these men were positivists and therefore anti-metaphysical, they were not 
regarded by the anti-formalists as being empirical enough because they were 
associated with a priori reasoning which was not based on actual study of facts 
(as we can see in Mill’s formal logic and Bentham’s hedonic calculus). 
Romanticism was especially critical of the historical approach of English 
utilitarianism. But unlike the sociological thinking of Roscoe Pound’s persuasion 
which looked like Bentham’s utilitarian thinking, it was adaptable to abstract 
analysis of society as visible in the doctrine of the end and purpose of law on the 
basis of which Pound (721-723) describes law as a means of controlling 
conflicting human interests. A careful study of the foregoing analysis indicates 
that those writers were concerned with pragmatism, because of the need to 
enlarge knowledge empirically and to relate it to solving practical problems in 
their society. Their attitude reflected a situation in which truth was linked with 
practical success in solving intellectual problems. For Dewey (35), knowledge 
was a kind of experience based on human actions and attainable with the 
solution of a problem. Incidentally, such knowledge was made possible through 
instrumentalism.  
Freeman (799) explains Veblen’s emphasis on the need for empirical 
study of institutions, especially the connection between economic institutions 
and other aspects of culture, adding that the new historians stressed the 
economic forces in social life. While stressing the contributions of these thinkers, 
Freeman writes:  
The new historians stressed the economic forces in social life and the 
need to study history as a pragmatic means of controlling man’s future. 
All of these currents of thought played a vital role in the gradual 
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movement of the United States from a highly individualist to a form of 
collective society, in the first half of the twentieth century (800). 
From the view credited to the new historian, it is clear that philosophy is a way 
of life and can further be described as a way to live by and perhaps die for. Since 
for the Americans this way of life is pragmatism, it qualifies as philosophy for a 
world of practical people.  
American legal realism is rooted in the philosophy of a changing but 
stable world. This explains the cultural dynamics of American law in terms of 
the roles played by the institutions of legislation, adjudication, and 
administration of justice. It might be argued that American realism was 
influenced by the introduction of philosophical pragmatism. However, with the 
decline of realism in the 20th century, philosophical pragmatism has re-echoed in 
the work of Richard Posner as pragmatism in law, its interest being to show 
pragmatism as a disposition to ground policy judgement on facts and 
consequences rather than on conceptualism and generalities. Posner (11) 
maintains that to be pragmatic is to be instrumental, forward looking, empirical, 
sceptical, and anti-dogmatic. It is Posner’s belief that one can subscribe both to 
pragmatism and to espousing an economic analysis of law; and for him, 
economics is the instrumental science par excellence. Posner’s attitude to law 
and pragmatism can be seen as an attempt to extend legal realism rather than 
annul it, since his primary intention has been to fill the gaps left unfilled by the 
realists.  
However, the search for greater certainty in American legal practice has 
led to two other levels of theorising among American realists based on 
recommendations for legal education and use of computers for consistency. On 
the one hand, William Twining describes the dominant focus of contention at 
the time of the emergence of American realism on what law schools should 
teach and the methods for teaching them. Twining (848) maintains that the 
scope and methods of legal research includes development of an empirical 
science to be performed by legal institutions, concepts, principles, and rules in a 
rapidly changing American society; and the relationship between law and the 
social sciences such as economics, sociology and anthropology. In any case, it 
might be said that these are not ultimate or philosophical questions although 
they may suggest further enquiry.  On the other hand, we can see in the 
thoughts of Reginald Walter Michael Dias that contemporary American writers 
have argued to the effect of greater certainty in judicial decisions by calling for 
the Application of computers in judicial reasoning in so far as there is 
consistency in decision and attitude to adjudication. Dias (367-8) maintains that 
the use of computer is intended to deal with facts and attitudes, in terms of 





correlation between circumstances in particular cases and decisions given in 
them and correlation between personal attitudes to policies and decisions given. 
Facts refer to conditions under which a decision was taken and personal 
attitudes can be overcome by scalograms to show the sharing of a set of values 
by courts. But these assumptions have been rebutted on grounds that personal 
elements are relevant in considering the variety of facts available to varying 
circumstances concerning similar cases. So far, the debate goes on and it is not 
certain when the suggestion might be considered acceptable. In what follows, 
we shall be concerned to show the logic of American law.   
EXPLORING THE LOGICS OF AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM  
There are attempts to compare and contrast legal realism with positive, 
sociological and natural law theories. American legal realism is a combination of 
analytical positivists and sociological approaches. It is argued that realism is like 
positivism in looking on law as an expression of the will of the state; but for 
realists, the state expresses its will through the medium of the court. Explaining 
this view in terms of the notion of command, Paul J. Fitzgerald maintains that 
legal realists look on law as a command of the sovereign just as legal 
imperativists do but their sovereign is not a monarch or parliament, rather it is 
the court or judges.  Fitzgerald (35) argues that to be a legal realist is to see law 
for what it really is without any pretentions. In other words, to take a realistic 
attitude toward law is to see law in terms of its practical function in society.  
Law is therefore not an abstract entity in the Platonic world of ideas; it is instead 
a fact of human experience. In addition to this, Dias (620) maintains that 
American realism is partly sociological – in as much as the approach is 
interested in sociological and other factors that influence the law, but they are 
concerned with law rather than with society. Like sociologists, American realists 
have interest in the effect of social conditions of law and its effect on society 
while emphasizing the need for a priori revelation of the behaviour of lawyers. 
Realism is a revolt against formalism: which is also why legal realism is opposed 
to legal positivism and natural law theory. 
Realism is a standard view which affirms the actual existence of some 
kinds of thing, or some kind of facts or state of affairs.  Its practical utility is 
particularly felt in America and Sweden, which is why we have heard of 
American and Scandinavian legal realisms represented by Oliver W. Holmes 
(1841 – 1935) and Karl H. Olivecrona (1897 – 1980) respectively. Freeman (872) 
remarks that Scandinavian realism operates within the European empirical 
tradition while American realism bears important characteristics of the English 
tradition.  Two senses of legal realism are historically well known in America – 
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Old and New or classical and modern. The old sense of realism is a logico-
metaphysical theory, which deals with the reality of universals in themselves 
and their relations to individuals or particulars. Its classical expression is the 
belief that universals are real in the mind of God, in nature, and in their 
historical apprehension by human minds. The modern sense of the term is a 
logico-epistemological theory, which involves the belief that phenomena exist 
independent of consciousness and this is often termed “empirical” or “naïve” 
realism: and on this count, our perception of universals is governed by their 
intuitive cognition. We can therefore explain the relationship between 
metaphysics and epistemology by reference to logic. In the attempt to shape 
legal realism, the logician is confronted with the existence of formal and 
material relations as well as the possibility of interaction between them such as 
necessary and contingent as well as theoretical and practical. The logician either 
looks for necessary connection between phenomena or he looks for necessary 
conditions for supposing that such a connection exists. However, Joseph 
Omoregbe maintains that contemporary philosophers are not interested in 
necessary connection but in necessary conditions to justify relations of cause and 
effect. Based on this, it would seem that logic can serve as a connecting rod 
between metaphysical and epistemological entities, thus broaching the 
distinction between them. In American law, the old and the new approaches 
tend to interact (for instance) when we see what judges and lawyers do in the 
courts as an imaginary auction in which the highest bidder is declared winner.   
Underlying the philosophy of American legal realism is a two-fold 
system of logics, one concerned with its construction and the connections within 
the system, the other concerned with its operation or working out within the 
people’s culture; and together they share a tendency towards broaching the 
dichotomy between seemingly opposed realities such as thought and action, 
theory and practice. Our construction theory on American law therefore 
involves internal and external logics: the internal aspect is concerned with 
interconnectedness of those features that link the central tenets of the old and 
new realisms together, while the external aspect is concerned with the harmony 
that exists between thought and action in American legal practice. In this 
section, we shall examine the internal aspect by explicating its structure with a 
view to establishing the interconnectedness of the elements within the system, 
while we shall leave the external aspect for the next section on questions about 
the interaction of law and life in the American society. 
Central to the logic of American legal realism is the claim that law is the 
practice of the courts. Holmes (457) explains this thesis by saying that law is the 
prophecy of what the court will do in fact and nothing more pretentious. More 





formally, this means that law is judge-made; and this view is shared by all 
realists in the sphere of jurisprudence. Holmes’ thesis is concerned to show that 
law is prediction because the “bad man” (litigant or criminal) is interested in 
predicting the outcome of judicial decisions instead of what the statute books 
say about conduct. Although scholars maintain that legal realists generally do 
not constitute a particular school of thought, nevertheless we sometimes refer 
rather loosely to the existence of such a school of law. The starting point for 
describing American legal realism may be found in Karl Llewellyn’s Some 
Realism About Realism, In which Llewellyn writes:  
What then are the characteristics of these ferments? One thing is clear. 
There is no school of realists. There is no likelihood that there will be 
such a school. There is no group with an official or accepted, or even with 
an emerging creed. There is no abnegation of independent striking out, 
we hope that there may never be. New recruits acquire tools and 
stimulus, not masters, nor overmastering ideas. Old recruits diverge in 
interest from each other. They are related, says Frank, only in their 
negation and in their skepticism and in their curiosity. There is, however, 
a movement in thought and law. The movement, the method of attack, is 
wider than the number of its adherents… (830-831).  
We may agree with Llewellyn that there is no particular school of American 
legal realism, because thinkers within this tradition are practicing lawyers and 
law teachers who happen to be drawn from several strands of opinion. The 
implication seems to be that they do not share a particular set of opinions. In 
spite of this, we can determine the logical structure of American legal realism 
from the standpoint of similarities and differences of features of the differing 
strands of thinkers. 
Although Llewellyn has clearly enumerated the reasons for supposing 
that there is no school of realism, nevertheless he agrees with other thinkers that 
there is a movement in thought and law which claims this label based on its 
approach to enquiry. Llewellyn refers to thinkers within this tradition as 
sceptics. In line with this view, Jerome Frank argues that American realists 
constitute two sets of sceptics, namely “rule” and “fact” sceptics. According to 
Frank (827-829), American realists are broadly divided as to whether law is a 
rule or fact. The attempt to explain the logics of American legal realism 
recognises the important doctrine that law is a fact rather than a rule, and this 
deals with the status of propositions about the existence of law. The question to 
be addressed is what do these propositions express? American realists share the 
belief that the kinds of thing described by law exist. Arguing for the nature of 
Ifiok: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies                                              Vol. 4, July, 2018 
 
106  
such existence, these realists maintain that the things described by the concept 
of law exist independent of us. They look at particular laws (or rules of law) as 
artifacts of our minds or language, or conceptual scheme. More so they believe 
that legal statements are not reducible to other kinds of statements, thus 
revealing them to be applicable to other subject-matters. Moreover it seems to 
them that legal statements describe aspects of the world and therefore their 
truth and falsity depend on facts in that world. This shows that we can attain 
truths about law, thus making it appropriate to believe those things we claim in 
the field of law. American realists therefore share a distrust of traditional legal 
rules and concepts insofar as they purport to describe what courts and people 
are actually doing. Also identified with this crop of thinkers is a distrust of the 
theory that traditional rule formulations are the operative factors in predicting 
court decisions. There is a belief in the worthwhileness of grouping cases, thus 
emphasising the interconnectedness of laws. There is an insistence both on the 
evaluation of law in terms of its effect and on the worthwhileness of trying to 
find these effects and an insistence on pragmatic and sustained attack on legal 
problems, as well as a view that judicial behaviourism is guide to the idea and 
most pragmatic of laws. With these views in mind, American realists hope to 
establish effectiveness of law as required by justice.  
The relation theory of American legal realism is concerned with the 
attempt to show inter-connectedness of phenomena in the field of legal practice. 
In looking at law as a prophecy of the court, we are not only concerned with the 
process of adjudication but also with institutions of legislation and 
administration. At the centre of these institutions are the people whom the law 
is meant to serve. Thus American realists focus on how law applies to man in his 
environment. In view of this, the relation theory hinges on interaction between 
man and society side by side the roles played by law, courts and culture in the 
attempt to enhance social life. The essential elements of this logic are: 
i. a conception of reality as an existent in the empirical world rather than a 
mysterious entity in the rational or intellectual world where knowledge is 
conjectural. 
ii. a view of man as rights bearer: and therefore man is the reason for law; 
thus man is a set of normative interactions.   
iii. a belief that society is a collection of individuals or community of persons 
represented by a system of normative relations.   
iv. a temporary divorce of “is” and “ought”, which is to make a distinction 
between particulars and universals. 
v. an approach that takes truth to be the workability of a claim or theory: a 
practical rather than abstract way of looking at life. 
vi. a claim that the institution of law is rooted in the life of its community, 
thus making language and culture important legal considerations.  





vii. the view that legal reasoning is predicated upon the rhetoric of a self-
regulating market system: thus the life of the law is both logic and 
experience.   
viii. the fact that a validity of  law is its predictability: thus law is what courts 
will decide and this leads to the demand for greater certainty. 
ix. the justification of bivalence as the basic principle of the certainty of law: 
for example a person is either guilty or not guilty. 
x. a social order in which law is looked upon as a means to social ends: thus 
law is engineering. 
xi. a development plan in which law reflect social change rather than dictate 
it.  
xii. a system of practice in which the purpose and usefulness of law 
determine its shape and design. 
xiii. the pursuit of fairness through effectiveness and efficiency of the law as 
the ultimate goal of justice: thus law points to aesthetics instead of ethics.  
Certain points of departure are common to all American realists. To borrow 
from Llewellyn’s expression, they bear a cross relevance, a complementing, and 
interlocking of their various results as if they were guided by an invisible hand. 
They also show a tendency to similar fighting faith in their methods of attack on 
legal problems. These tenets constitute the bedrock of affirmations and 
negations for logic of American realism.  
Central to the conditions required to structure the internal logic of 
American legal realism is the tenet denoted by the concept of “reality” that 
distinguishes between experience and reason as one of the various dichotomies 
found in the theory: an one of its most formidable expressions is the principle of 
bivalence, which appears to have attracted serious criticisms from philosophers 
in the domains of logic and science. Michael Dummett, a British philosopher of 
logic and language, has put forward a critique of realism with profound 
implications for the operation of the American legal enquiry, but whether or not 
Dummett’s argument is acceptable in the particular situation of American law is 
quite a different thing altogether. In his Frege, Dummett (5) maintains that 
unrestricted use of the principle of bivalence is the trademark of realism. The 
realist says that a proposition is either true or false; Dummett counsels here that 
the status and truth of this law of classical logic have proved very controversial 
for three reasons.  First, it has problems that are associated with vagueness. 
Second, it is incompatible with constructivism: which divides knowledge 
between observation and theory statements. Third, it raises a number of 
problems with semantic paradoxes. The view therefore has to overcome some 
counter examples both ways. In his Truth, Dummett (49) criticises Gottlob Frege 
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on grounds that the principle of bivalence has problems in practical situations. 
There are several examples to learn from. We know that Thomas Aquinas is a 
moral realist; and while writing as such, Aquinas (250) argues that moral reality 
is not sufficiently structured so as to make every moral claim either true or false. 
What does Kant say about this? Kant (273) believes that we can use the principle 
of bivalence very happily in mathematics just because it is our own 
construction. What implications do these thinkers bring to bear on Dummett’s 
assessment of American realism? This paper argues that Dummett’s negative 
remark on the principle of bivalence tends to exalt the relevance of pragmatism 
to American legal thought as a philosophy which stresses faith in the 
workability of a belief or theory not itself capable of or dependent on literal 
truth or falsity and his view is sympathetic to verification and constructivism. 
On the one hand, verificationism is a metaphysical theory concerned with 
determination of meaning: and its argument is that the meaning of a statement 
consists in its methods of enquiry. This theory differs radically from the account 
that identifies meaning with truth condition and to which modern 
verificationists, like Dummett, show hostility to reductionism. On the other 
hand, Constructivism is a form of anti-realism which upholds the existence of 
facts and truth that are constituted by or dependent on our beliefs, reactions or 
attitudes. Incidentally, American realists deny these ways of theorising about 
law.         
 
INTERACTION OF LAW AND LIFE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 
 In the preceding section, we tried to draw from theory some implications 
for legal practice in America. In this section, we are to show in practice how the 
American officials approximate concepts such as reality, man, law, culture, 
justice, “is” and “ought”, rule and fact. Incidentally, these concepts may be 
analytically interpreted into concrete elements such as constitution, society, 
litigants, court, officials, lawyers, judges, bailiffs, stakeholders (and so on). It is 
our intention in this part of the paper to bring the philosophy and logic of 
American law to bear on the formulation of a systematic science of legal practice 
in America. This is crucial to our goals in formulating the external logic of 
American legal realism. The important point to make here is that the external 
logic of American law will serve as confirmation theory, if it correctly represents 
the way law and life interact in the American society. 
 The external logic of American law is concerned with the interaction of 
law and life in the American society, and the way to describe this interaction is 
to search for causal connection among social phenomena. We restate the 
argument that American realists differ in many ways: yet we will agree that in 





spite of differences of opinion among these realists, they tend to be governed by 
the language of factual existence of law and the rhetoric of a liberal and legalistic 
society in which the individual has primary rights and sovereignty is vested in 
the courts. Now, we may ask is there any causal connection between the court 
and the society in American law? Perhaps, this is another way of asking about 
the relationship between law and life in the US. We may now have to search for 
and deal with the causal nexus of such interaction. Omoregbe (180) describes a 
“cause” as that which brings about a certain effect or that by which something 
(an effect) is produced. However, pragmatists explain it as a social event 
requiring unity of thought and action. Metaphysicians look for universal 
principles or rational inference to support the relation of cause and effect, 
whereas empiricists see causation as a verifiable phenomenon of relations. But 
Francis O. Njoku maintains that the empiricists emphasis that generalises from 
the parameters of physical science is limited. Njoku (195) argues that the 
prototype of the scientific cause-effect relations where one thing follows 
another, has limited applications in the law or at the level of social life. It might 
be argued that states of affairs or conditions of fact may be related by causation; 
but following Hume’s thought on this principle, it would seem that the actual 
relation or causal power is imperceptible. Of course, it might be argued that 
legal causation is a body of rights, obligation and remedies that is applied by 
court in civil proceedings to provide relief for persons who have suffered harm 
from the wrongful acts of others. However, basically causality is a metaphysical 
phenomenon which has gained prominence in the vocabulary of the natural and 
social sciences. Therefore, the attempt to show causation with unity of thought 
and action, as American pragmatists do, goes to make legal discourse more 
scientific and less philosophical. But because this approach cannot completely 
eliminate philosophical reflection, we are not constrained to adopt a logical or 
rational analysis of American law. 
 We will like to clarify at this point that the American society of today is 
not a combination of laissez faire capitalist and socialist economic orientations, as 
some thinkers would say. We have argued somewhere in this paper that 
pragmatism is a form of humanism and is therefore concerned with welfarism. 
Modern America has a mixed economy or welfare state as it is often called. The 
essential qualities of capitalism in this society have proved far more compatible 
with the massive increases in regulatory and welfare programmes that most 
observers believed possible. The spirit of American life remains vigorously 
capitalistic because of the vitality of this cherishable economic principle.  
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Let us now discuss the concept of “reality” by seeking to know what it is 
that makes a person or ideas and practices American. A thorough investigation 
will reveal the fact that the unique and practical character of American political 
life is a product of their subjection to the ideal of “Americanism”, which 
involves love, devotion and unalloyed loyalty to America. Martin Diamond, 
Winston Mills Fisk and Herbert Garfinkel tell us in The Democratic Republic that 
every American citizen pledges allegiance to the Republic rather than to 
America as their fatherland so far as equality and justice prevail, thus making 
American legal and political life society-based rather than cultural. Quite 
evidently, the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 begins with the 
expressions that all men are created equal and endowed by their creator with 
certain inalienable rights including life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and 
that the security of these rights informs the institution of government among 
men with the implication that government derives its just powers from the 
consent of the governed. The Declaration, as a practical document, is the 
theoretical transformation by the American constitution. America is a pluralistic 
society, and in that society the fact that man is rights-bearing animal is 
predicated upon the doctrine of equality of all persons and races. The rights of 
all citizens (Negroes and white) in America are embodied in executive orders 
and legislations. Such executive orders include the fair employment practices of 
law; promotion of equal employment opportunities in the Federal Civil Service 
and by private government contractors; and removal of racial discrimination in 
the armed forces. Notable legislations include civil rights laws which aim at 
ensuring the voting rights of Negro citizens; as well as literacy of society, equal 
access to public accommodations, assuring the rights of all persons to be served 
in hotels, theatres, restaurants, gasoline service stations and similar 
establishments.  The existence of all these rights and many more go to foster 
equality of all persons and races. Members of the convention on the declaration 
of independence describe the fundamental rights that are based on the quality of 
all men and races as self-evident truth, because they see these rights as facts in 
the empirical world. This view is also given prominence by John Finnis, a 
natural law thinker in the contemporary era. In his Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, Finnis argues that natural rights are self evident principles that shape 
man’s practical reasoning and are known to men not through any universal or 
rational inference but by way of an assemblage of reminders of the range of 
possibly worthwhile activities and orientations open to one. Finnis (171) 
maintains that we can gain knowledge of these rights from anthropological and 
psychological studies of society and these goes to show that these rights are 
empirically discerned.   However, we will agree that in mathematical parlance, 





self-evident truths are not open to empirical proof, since they are knowable a 
priori. But as a realist, George Edward Moore argues in his Proof of the External 
World, that it is self-evident truth for him to be aware of his two hands stuck to 
his shoulders. Of course, Blackburn (345) maintains that the concept of self-
evident truth is not a useful philosophical parlance because what is self-evident 
to one person may not be so to another. We are then left with the famous dictum 
proposed by John Locke, that nothing is present in the intellect which did not 
come through the senses and this serves to justify the American position.   
In America, justice is synonymous with efficiency and effectiveness of the 
law; and one of the ways it has achieved this is through the structure of 
government such as the operation of the doctrine of separation of powers and 
the creation of the offices of the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General 
as administrative staff.  Clinton Rossiter explains the idea of practical equality in 
America, according to which the separation of the legislative, executive and 
judicial powers of government is the fundamental institutional feature of 
American National government. Based on this, Rossiter (104) maintains that the 
preservation of liberty requires the separation of the three great departments of 
power and this has helped in creating the most independent judiciary that the 
world has ever seen. The Attorney General functions fully as administrator, 
politician and presidential adviser as well as head of government’s legal service. 
The executive has a veto and congress participates in appointments of officials. 
Nevertheless, it would seem that separation of powers in American government 
is not absolute; but we can strongly say that the “American judiciary is a 
coordinate branch of American national government – a statement that can be 
made of very few judiciaries in the world” (Diamond, Fisk and Garfinkel 286). 
American courts make much substantive law part of which occur in the 
traditional common law, they apply legislative statutes to particular cases and 
thereby make law by filling the gaps left or omitted by congress. By the 
construction that American courts give to statutory provisions they profoundly 
influence the meaning of the statute and its application. Impartially, Americans 
have given the statute a wealth of contemporary relevance and impact that its 
draft men did not dream of while remaining faithful to the fundamental policies 
of the statutes. More so, American courts exercise powerful and pervasive 
control and influence over practically all the executive and administrative 
processes and organisations and therefore over the actual task of government.  
However, there is something to note at this point. It would seem that all 
constitutional governments throughout the world open the provisions of their 
constitutions with their source of authority, and for the Americans it is this 
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source of authority that generates the feeling of equality of all men and races in 
terms of distribution of rights and privileges under the constitution. All true 
democracies share the belief that fundamental human and natural rights are 
inalienable irrespective of how they are discerned, whether empirically 
endowed and verifiable or rationally and spiritually discerned. Implicit in our 
political, moral and legal practices are such assumptions even though they may 
not be explicitly expressed in the course of deliberations at litigation. It is on the 
precincts of such assumptions that natural lawyers rest their legal philosophy. 
Now since the American declaration of independence is inescapably 
adumbrated with concerns of fundamental and natural rights, we can see traces 
of natural law theory that are based on reason and presuppose ethical and 
metaphysical thoughts in American law. More so, where the court may require 
persons coming or brought before it to swear an oath by God that the evidence 
they will give in satisfaction of their claims will be nothing but the whole truth, 
it is a clear indication of recognition for natural law assumptions. Do American 
courts act in this way? The answer to this question is yes. Specifically as a 
requisite of procedural law, Americans pledge allegiance to their Republic only 
so far as the republic, “under God”, seeks to deliver liberty and justice for all. 
The key expression in the foregoing statement is “under God”, and we should 
be reminded here that America is fondly and popularly known as “God’s own 
country” in thought and practice, thus a high degree of decorum is expected of 
officials in the dispensation of justice.  
Diamond, Fisk and Garfinkel are concerned to show the legalistic thrust 
of law at the point of interaction with life in American society. These scholars 
see legalism as the connecting rod in the chain of relations between the court 
and the society. In other words, legalism is central to interaction of law and life 
in the American situation. Following this line of thought, Alexis de Tocqueville 
writes: 
… in the United States a legalistic spirit is confined strictly to the 
precincts of the courts; it extends far beyond them…. There is hardly a 
political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn 
into a judicial one. Consequently the language of every day party-
political controversy has to be borrowed from legal phraseology and 
conceptions.  As most public men are or have been lawyers, they apply 
their legal habit and turn of mind to the conduct of affairs. Juries make all 
classes familiar with this. So legal language is pretty well adopted into 
common speech; the spirit of the law, born within schools and courts, 
spreads little by little beyond them; it infiltrate through society right 





down to the lowest rank till finally the whole people have contracted 
some of the ways and tastes of a magistrate (283). 
The possibility of making legalism the thrust of life in America is that in 
American society law derives from life, not the other way round. The argument 
being made here is that legalism is part and parcel of American culture (life 
ways of the American people). Since the judiciary in America is one of the three 
political arms of government, it is sometimes said with suspicion that in 
America, law is politics and cannot therefore be divorced from ideology. How 
do we understand this claim? 
We will agree that in theory, law and politics in America are described in 
sociological parlance as social engineering. However, in practice law and 
politics are not treated as a matter of “full proof” engineering, but what the 
society seeks to achieve. The immediate use to which law is put or the benefits 
derived by society has been to balance conflicting claims or to enforce or foster 
the distribution of rights. We know that engineering science is concerned with 
improvement of physical facilities while legal engineering is concerned with 
improvement in the social system of society and this depends for its sufficiency 
on the practical consequences that a proposed decision is likely to bring about 
on society rather than the parties in dispute. As Michael Rundell describes it, 
engineering is the activity of designing things such as roads, railway, bridges, or 
machines. Rundell (488) sees an engineer as one who arranges something to 
happen, especially in a useful and skillful way; and we can say that it is in this 
way that judges manage to engineer litigation between disputing parties.  
Rundell gives an example of how government officials manage to engineer 
(broker) a meeting between two ambassadors. We can then say that as 
professionals, legal officials try to arrange litigation in useful and skillful way to 
suit society. The American judiciary is accorded a special status by the original 
constitutional convention of 1776 to settle cases. Incidentally, members of the 
constitutional convention maintain that the business of judging should be fair 
and unbiased and therefore as remote from the political process as possible. 
Nevertheless, it can be said that judicial decision-making in America “is policy 
reached only in a prescribed manner, and that this manner is crucial” (Diamond, 
Fisk and Garfinkel 284).  
 The fact that in America politics is not a matter of full proof engineering 
but what society wants to achieve with it explains the conscious direction of 
American law to the achievement of social goals, and it is in applying law this 
way that Pound (723) describes law as “social engineering”. On this account, 
Pound is arguing for more recognition and satisfaction of human wants or 
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claims or desires through social control; a more embracing and effective 
securing of social interests; a complete and effective elimination of waste and 
precluding of friction in human enjoyment of the good things of life. This 
requirement is based on the role played by the application of pragmatism to 
American law. It stands to reason that countries, like Nigeria, which try to adopt 
British and American legal models at the same time, could be highly confused in 
making law work out to the advantage of their society, because utilitarianism 
which Britain upholds and pragmatism which America upholds can hardly fuse 
into a workable legal system. Nigeria and America inherited the utilitarian 
principle as British colonies, but while America abandoned this principle at the 
time of her declaration of independence, Nigeria did not. Michael Nguzi Nnam 
explains Nigeria’s adoption of the presidential system of government from 
America together with American legal realism without yielding to pragmatism. 
Nnam (45) maintains that with the adoption of the presidential system in 1975, 
Nigerian Judges had the privilege of discharging the law with a touch of 
“Americanism” in the face of the judicial process which retained the English 
heritage of status, common law and equity introduced in colonial days. In 
addition to this, Nnam maintains that in Nigeria it is the president who appoints 
federal judges with approval of the senate and he can single-handedly remove 
them from office without reference to the citizens. Therefore, a general lack of 
confidence in the Nigerian judiciary resulted from the fact that it could be 
manipulated by politicians. It is arguable that the culture, language and rhetoric 
of the Nigerian people do not fit the facts of American legal and political 
orientation. Unfortunately still, Nigerians have no choice but to think legally in 
borrowed languages – English and Arabic. In Nigeria, sovereignty lies in the 
legislature and the court is very far away from the people, aside the fact that the 
society is predominantly illiterate and leadership falls upon the few in the 
bourgeoisie or elite group usually called majority. The problem is not only with 
Nigeria but includes those colonised territories in all continent of the world – 
Africa, Antarctica, Asia, Australia, Europe, North and South America.  
While exploring the nature of judicial power in America, Tocqueville 
(103-104) describes it as “passive” and this means that it cannot be exercised 
without being summoned forth, because a law has been disputed or rights are 
contested. The American judge is to be seen as an arbitrator who may not 
interfere in disputes unless there are contending parties to genuine controversy 
and a case is brought before the court for determination. The business of the 
judge may take the form of pronouncing upon a party a law by referring to a 
particular case and taking cognisance of the set of circumstances before him in 
his official capacity. However, since deciding cases by reference to particular 





circumstances tends to limit the scope of the judge’s capacity, the other 
alternative open to him has been to use “general principles” (legislation) to 
decide cases that fall under the same category. Here, it is argued that where 
there is no dispute, there is no case and therefore there is no judicial decision. 
The practical approach of shifting between particular and general considerations 
explains realism’s theoretical temporal break with positivism in terms of “law as 
it is”. The distinction between the operation of rule and fact in American law 
could be seen as a matter of interpretation which is overcome by stressing the 
point that a legal rule is a proposition which expresses a set of facts, and this 
broaches the dichotomy between them. 
 At this point, we return to legalism both as fact and value of American 
law. First, what is legalism? Second, how does legalism operate in America? We 
may describe legalism as a programme of action based on the grounds that 
politics affect the life of the average American citizen through instrumentality of 
the courts. It is the practical means for setting up a workable ideological praxis 
for liberalism as a system of political practice in America. Blackburn (218) 
defines liberalism as a system of thought and political practice based on the 
individual considered as possessing rights against the government: such rights 
include equality of respect, freedom of expression and action, and freedom from 
religious and ideological constraint. We can see here that every American citizen 
is made to share the consciousness of how the liberal and legalistic attitudes of 
American political life interact. With liberalism the American society is able to 
absorb differing kinds of opinion; and with legalism it is able to integrate 
differing groups or classes of people. These are the ways in which the 
interaction of realism and pragmatism works in America for the Americans and 
therefore the truth about American law. As far as pragmatism in American legal 
practice is concerned, judgements in courts tend to reflect such legalistic 
attitude. Incidentally, it would seem that the judge is looking for the best 
decision having in mind present and future needs. It does not regard the 
maintenance of consistency with past decisions as an end in itself but only as a 
means for bringing about the best result in the present case. It is not clear from 
the foregoing whether or not one can completely avoid ethical and metaphysical 
considerations in explaining American law; but we can draw some implications 
for them. We are looking at a country with a free people characterised by 
equality of all persons under law. We are looking at a country in which the 
courts are independent and their salaries are free from external influences. We 
are looking at a country in which errors of the courts cannot be corrected by any 
power outside the legal system. More so, it is assured that officials cannot be 
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removed from office for making erroneous adjudication. Yet we cannot deny the 
possibility of such errors or rely upon their impossibility because their problems 
lie in the region of ethics and metaphysics. American realists therefore have 
more credible grounds of investigations to make in this domain of discourse. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The central proposition of legal realism generally is that law is the 
practice of the court. This implies that law is based on custom and language 
plays an important role in a people’s legal culture. The structure of this legal 
theory differs from one paradigm to another. We have reconstructed American 
legal realism on rational grounds to show unity of theory and practice with the 
outcome that the realist movement in American law depends for its analysis on 
rational action and every rational action has its philosophy, logic and science. In 
doing this, we have been concerned to show certain unifying tenets of its 
diverse theorists as culminated in Holmes, Llewellyn and Frank. They consist 
essentially of man, society, law, court, officials and these elements lead to the 
idea of law as prediction. Three of these tenets are that judges are law-makers; 
that law is a technique for predicting judicial outcomes in particular cases; and 
that law should not shape social change rather than reflect it. It is however 
difficult to justify the validity of this procedure outside the culture of the 
American people. At first sight, American legal realism looks attractive on the 
basis of its philosophy and methods of logic and science. It is pragmatic; and 
pragmatism tends to have its origin in American culture. This means that the 
manner in which law is done in America belongs naturally to the people’s way 
of life. Its model of liberal thinking looks forward to what will serve the 
community. American legal realism is therefore associated with the scientific 
method and applied to American custom, which is why American laws are 
more rather than less conventional. We are here charged with specific 
injunctions to look into the practices of the people within particular spheres of 
human endeavour, but because American law picks and chooses its objects in 
the spirit of its ideology, it cannot be seen as neutral. Legal actions are deducible 
from imaginary models representing legal rules.  
 The culmination of the foregoing is that it is important to study and 
understand a people’s way of life before trying to adopt their legal experience. 
This is very crucial to countries which were colonies of foreign powers and 
which after their independence have not found veritable grounds for resting 
their legal order. For a country like Nigeria to seek after the American model, 
Nigeria must forge a philosophy, logic and science compatible with her diverse 





cultural practices, as well as language and rhetoric of the people’s social 
existence and use this to develop a working plan of action in a practical sense. 
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